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Abstract
Risk of sovereign debt default has frequently affected emerging market and de-
veloped economies. Such financial crisis are often accompanied with severe declines
of employment that are hard to justify using a standard dynamic stochastic model.
In this paper, I document that a labor wedge deteriorates substantially around swift
reversals of current accounts or default episodes. I propose and evaluate two different
explanations for these movements by linking the wedges to changes in labor taxes and
in the cost of working capital. By adding these two features in a dynamic model of
equilibrium default I am able to replicate the behavior of the labor wedge observed
in the data around financial crisis. In the model, higher interest rates are propagated
into larger costs of hiring labor through the presence of working capital. As an econ-
omy is hit with a stream of bad productivity shocks, the incentives to default become
stronger, thus increasing the cost of debt. This reduces firm demand for labor and
generates a labor wedge. A similar effect is obtained with a counter-cyclical income
tax rate policy. The model is used to shed light on the recent events of the Euro Area
debt crisis and in particular of the Greek default event.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign default crises are events usually associated with large economic costs. In
particular, countries that experience such events typically experience large drops in both
output and employment. Mendoza and Yue (2012) notes, by looking at a set of emerging
economies, that default events are associated with deep recessions where employment falls
of average by about 15% lower compared with pre-crisis levels. More recently, the same
kind of patterns have been observed in the advanced economies that were in the epicenter
of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis, namely Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. One natural
question to ask is, therefore, if the observed fall in employment in these events is unusual at
the light of standard economic theory (e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007) given an
equally large fall in output. Showing evidence suggesting that the answer to this question is
negative, this paper advances with an explanation where labor markets distortions arise as
a consequence of limited access to credit markets by governments on the onset of a sovereign
debt crisis.
To motivated the claim that labor market distortions are increasing during episodes of
sovereign default, the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis is used as a main source of empirical
evidence. One main advantage of using this set of countries resides on the availability of
high frequency data for series such as output, consumption, and employment. The data
analysis suggests that European countries that were close or defaulted during the crisis
are also the ones where the long-term, otherwise, statistically stable correlation between
employment/output growth - traditionally coined as Okum’s law (Okun, 1962) - breaks
down on the aftermath of the crisis. Additionally, using the Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan,
2007 accounting methodology, it is shown that measured labor wedges, often associated
with distortions, deteriorated much faster for countries that were more severely affected
by the debt crisis. When regressed against a set of controls, worse labor wedges wedges
are statistically associated with higher government interest rate spreads thus suggesting
a channel over which adverse government credit conditions spillover into labor market
distortions.
These empirical observations are rationalized with a dynamic stochastic model of de-
fault with endogenous labor supply. As standard in sovereign default models of the Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) type, the government has limited commitment in honoring its debt
contracts, implying that interest rates on borrowing include a premium over the risk-free
rate demanded by international investors to compensate for the risk of default. Because the
government is assumed to be impatient and debt is non-contingent, the interest rate spread
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displays a counter-cyclical as the debt burden become more onerous to the government
when the economy is in recession with a consequent fall in revenue. Given these interest
rate spread dynamics, a financial crisis is associated with sharp tightness of credit market
access triggered by a sequence of negative productivity shocks. To link these financial crises
with the labor market, the model adds two additional features. First, the government only
has access to distortionary taxation and debt to finance public consumption. This im-
plies that distortionary taxes have to be raised when access to credit markets becomes
constrained thus distorting the household labor supply decision. Second, the model also
assumes that firms are required to keep working capital to finance their salary payments.
Additional, and in line with the literature (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006;
Arellano and Kocherlakota, 2014), it is assumed that high government interest rates spill
over to high corporate interest rates. This creates an additional source of distortions on
labor markets from the demand end. In summary, both the distortionary taxation and
working capital requirements work as frictions that distort labor markets when the gov-
ernment is close to default. As a result the fall in employment is larger that what would
been without these frictions. Under this framework, default entails costs in terms of loss
productivity and financial market access. On the reserve side, repudiating debt can release
resources to both public and private consumption. At the same time, more resources also
relaxes the fiscal constraint and allows the government to stop tax increases. In every
period the government evaluates the costs and benefits of defaulting and acts accordingly.
A simulated version of this model is computed to match the economy of Greece. Several
features of the Greek business cycle moments are captured in the model. In particular
the model generates counter-cyclical interest spreads or tax rates, a characteristic usually
associated to emerging market economies (Cuadra et al., 2010; Vegh and Vuletin, 2012). In
this paper, counter-cyclical tax rates arise due to imperfect credit market access. It is also
due to these dynamics of interest and tax rates that explain the main results of the simu-
lation: on the path to default employment falls substantially and is followed by increased
distortions in the labor markets. The model accounts for a 13% decline of employment
from 3 years before default (against an observation of 17% for Greece) from which 4pp is
accounted by distortionary taxes and an additional 4pp from working capital constraints.
This paper is builds on the literature on endogenous default risk. Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), or Arellano (2008) developed sovereign default models
where the probability of default is increasing when debt is high or income low. However,
these papers assume that the government is able to transfer resources to households in a
non-distortionary fashion, thus abstract from fiscal constraints. In Cuadra et al. (2010), a
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similar model of sovereign default extended to include endogenous labor and distortionary
consumption and conclude that under imperfect credit access tax rates become counter-
cyclical. Arellano and Bai (2013) use a similar paper to obtain the result that exogenously
raising labor taxes may be self-defeating in the sense that the impact of distortions may
reduce the revenue base used by the government to repay debt. Despite these important
conclusions, neither paper attempt to quantitatively account for the labor market implica-
tions of a pro-cyclical tax policy.
Also related is the literature that uses interest rate shocks as a main source of fluc-
tuations in emerging economies. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006)
present models where firms require working capital to pay salaries in advance financed
by external debt. This imply that labor demand is reduced when interest rates are high.
An important setback of these models relies on the fact that interest rates are completely
exogenous and, for that reason, disconnected from the level of government indebtedness.
Using a model of sovereign default, Mendoza and Yue (2012), assume that some imported
inputs require working capital financing, thus providing a channel over which endogenous
interest rate fluctuations affect firms decisions. However, this paper also abstracts from
fiscal constraints and the model cannot generate a fall in labor at defaults as seen in the
data.
Finally, the literature that uses the accounteing methodology developed by Chari, Ke-
hoe, and McGrattan (2007) to study labor market distortions as measured by labor wedges.
For example, Karabarbounis (2014), using a set of developed and emerging economies points
out the the labor wedge is in general pro-cyclical, that is, it deteriorates when output is
in recession, while Ohanian et al. (2007) regress labor wedges against a set of regressors
and conclude that labor taxes affect negatively this wedge. Neither of these authors relates
their wedges with financial crisis. An exception comes from Pratap and Quintin (2011)
that associate distortions in labor markets to increases in interest rates and tax rates in the
Mexican crisis of 1994, however, in their model, interest are exogenously determined and
taxes play no role.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents empirical
evidence on labor market distortions arising from the Euro Area debt crisis; section 3
presents a model that rationalizes such evidence; section 4 calibrates the model for the
Greek economy and run some robustness checks; and section 5 concludes. The appendix A
presents some additional evidence and describes the computational methods used.
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2 Empirical Evidence
The EZ crisis starting in 2008 is marked by a large heterogeneity in the macroeconomic
responses within each country. Table 1 shows the length and depth of the recession for
the different countries composing the European monetary union at the beginning of 20081.
It is quite evident that some countries experienced large and prolonged recessions while
others did not. For the case of Greece, the recession is even comparable to the US great
depression with a length of more that 6 years followed by a 27% fall in output and an 20pp
increase in unemployment (as in figure 1). With the exception of Italy and Slovenia where
labor markets stayed more contained, this was also the pattern observed for the other
countries that experienced prolonged recessions. Given that Greece, Portugal, Ireland,
Spain all received financial assistance from official creditors, a natural question to ask is if
that recession, apart from its length depth, had any unusual features.
Table 1: 2008 Recession cycle of Euro Area countries
Peak Trough Diff ∆Y (%) ∆C (%) ∆U (pp) ∆E (pp)
Austria 2008q1 2009q2 5 -5.8 1.7 1.2 -0.5
Belgium 2008q2 2009q1 3 -4.2 -0.6 1.1 -0.3
Germany 2008q1 2009q1 4 -6.9 1.3 -0.2 0.3
Spain 2008q2 2013q2 20 -8.0 -8.6 15.8 -9.4
Finland 2007q4 2009q2 6 -9.6 -0.4 1.9 -2.0
France 2008q1 2009q2 5 -4.0 0.8 2.0 -0.7
Greece 2007q2 2013q4 26 -27.4 -22.2 19.2 -11.0
Ireland 2007q4 2012q2 18 -9.7 -9.9 10.0 -9.9
Italy 2008q1 2014q4 27 -9.6 -5.9 6.4 -3.0
Netherlands 2008q1 2009q2 5 -4.2 0.5 0.4 0.1
Portugal 2008q1 2013q1 20 -9.6 -10.4 9.5 -8.3
Slovenia 2008q2 2012q4 18 -11.2 -2.7 5.3 -4.3
Notes: Data source: OECD. Output and consumption are OECD volume estimates. As in Harding and
Pagan (2002), peak and trough turning points are determined using the following methodology: (1) output
is measured in logs at quarterly frequency; (2) peaks are selected when yt = max {yt−2, yt−1, yt, yt+1, yt+2}
and troughs when yt = min {yt−2, yt−1, yt, yt+1, yt+2}; (3) censoring rules apply where peaks and troughs
have to alternate and the minimum phase is 2 quarters with a 5 quarters minimum cycle.
A simple way to analyze this question is look for deviations of the historical relation-
ship between employment and output change. Figure 1 shows very clearly how output is
1Luxembourg has a population of 0.5 millions and because of such small size it is not included in this
analysis.
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negatively correlated with unemployment, a well identified relationship known as Okun’s
law. Recent studies 2 indicate that such relationship has been kept strong and stable for
most countries, even after including the 2008 Great Recession. Typical analysis point that
different linear slopes characterizing the relationship employment/output in different coun-
tries are due to different labor market frictions or market structures. However, if such
environments are invariable during the business cycles, then the slope of the relationship
absorbs such institutional features. In this sense, systematic deviations of that long-term
relationship can be indicative of a breakdown.
Figure 1: Output, consumption, and unemployment dynamics around Euro debt crises for
selected countries
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Data source: OECD
In order to study the impact of the European debt crisis on the stability of the Okun’s
law, figure 2 plots a scatter of employment changes against output changes. The figure
suggests that the employment has fallen faster relatively to output during the period of
2Examples include Ball et al. (2013) or Elsby, Hobijn, Şahin, Valletta, Stevenson, and Langan (2011).
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2009-2014 for the countries represented at the top panels as the red dots are substantially
below the historical trend line. This indicates that over the period, for each one percent of
output drop, employment fell more than the historical average.
Figure 2: Employment and output correlation for selected countries - red dots are of ob-
servations from after 2008
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A structural break of the relationship can be tested using a Chow test which consists
in estimating for each country the following regression using OLS
∆Et = β0 + β1∆Yt + α0D
2008
t + α1∆Yt ·D2008t + ut
where ∆Et, ∆Yt, and D2008t are change in employment, change in employment, and
a dummy variable taking one when t > 2008. The test consists in evaluating the null
hypothesis that α0 = 0 and α1 = 0 using a Wald statistic. The results of applying such
tests for all member countries of the EZ can be found in table 2. Five out of 12 countries
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present evidence statistical evidence that the Okun’s law has kept stable over the period.
For the remaining countries, Germany, France, and Netherlands show an improvement of
the relationship in the sense that less employment fall is associated with an 1 percent fall in
output, that is, either the slope decreases or the intercept increases. As for Spain, Greece,
Ireland, Italy and Portugal, the statistical evidence supports the idea that there was a
structural break in 2009 that aggravated labor market conditions.
Table 2: Okun’s Law structral break
Before 2009 After or 2009 Chow
b1 b0 R
2 N b1 b0 R
2 N (p-val)
Austria 0.20 0.005 0.20 52 0.23 0.006 0.69 25 0.47
Belgium 0.55 -0.002 0.31 48 0.30 0.002 0.37 24 0.25
Germany 0.37 0.000 0.26 56 0.05 0.005 0.06 24 0.00
Spain 1.34 -0.009 0.65 36 1.50 -0.012 0.96 24 0.71
Finland 0.29 0.00 0.14 40 0.27 0.00 0.52 24 0.12
France 0.72 -0.005 0.77 56 0.50 -0.002 0.89 25 0.01
Greece 0.12 0.010 0.03 56 0.79 -0.005 0.59 24 0.00
Ireland 0.42 0.014 0.46 56 0.70 -0.018 0.55 24 0.00
Italy 0.19 0.010 0.18 40 0.16 -0.004 0.19 24 0.00
Netherlands 0.49 0.003 0.40 40 -0.24 -0.006 0.15 24 0.00
Portugal 0.46 -0.002 0.48 40 0.68 -0.012 0.58 24 0.01
Slovenia 0.26 -0.005 0.08 52 0.05 -0.010 0.03 23 0.04
Notes: Data source OECD. The coefficients b1 and b0 are the slope and intercept coefficient of the corre-
sponding regressions. A standard dummy variables method is used to preform the Chow’s test assuming
the break occurs at the first quarter of 2009.
A different approach to inspect labor market conditions makes use of the accounting
methodology developed by Chari et al. (2007). This derives a wedge that reflects the
difference of what is observed in the data and the prediction of a neoclassical growth
model in some key variables. The difference measured in the wedge accounts for unknown
factors that are unaccounted by a frictionless standard economic model. Specifically, the
methodology presents a labor market equilibrium equation of the form:
ult/uct = ωt · yt/ht (1)
where ult and uct are the marginal utility of labor and consumption at time t; yt the
output, ht hours; and ωt represents the labor wedge. Because different utility functions
have different functional forms, the wedge measurement will also differ. In practice, for this
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exercise, the two most widely used utility functions in the literature are chosen3:
uCRRA(c, h) =
c1−σ
1− σ − Γ ·
h1+γ
1 + γ
uGHH(c, h) =
(
c− Γ · h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
/ (1− σ)
Applying these utility functions to (1) imply the following wedges measurement:
ωˆCRRAt = (1 + γ)ht − yˆt + σcˆt
ωˆGHHt = (1 + γ)ht − yˆt
where a variable with an hat represents a log deviation from steady state4.
Figure 3 measures the cyclical component of these labor wedges for a subset of countries
in the EZ for a particular choice of the parameter values5. Both measures indicate that
countries in the EZ were differently affected by the recession. One can easily see that the
wedges deteriorated substantially for countries such as Greece, Portugal, or Ireland, while
were very stable for Germany, Finland, or Austria. This observation seem to suggest that
the severity of the financial crisis may be responsible for the adverse behavior in labor
markets. To better understand what is driving the labor wedge, the following panel data
regression is estimated for every quarter t and every country i from the EZ:
ωˆit = βi + βt + β1yˆit−1 + β2spreadit−1 + uit
where spreadit is the spread between the 10 year government yield of country i and Ger-
many for the quarter t. This variable is used as a proxy for the country specific severity
of the financial crisis. Table 3 shows the results. Across specifications and for both wedge
measures, the results are consistent at showing that the labor wedge is negatively correlated
with both the interest rate spread and the output gap. The last result is consistent with
previous studies (Karabarbounis, 2014) and simply states that the labor wedge is coun-
tercyclical. The results also show a negative correlation between the labor wedge and the
domestic financial conditions as captured by the interest rate spread. These, suggest that
3The parameters σ, γ, and Γ regulate an economic agent’s preferences for consumption and hours of
work.
4Specifically, for a level variable x, xˆt = log xt − log x¯t and x¯t is trend component of xt at time t.
5The parameter values are σ = 5 and γ = 0.5, which are exactly the same as the ones used in section
4, and very close to the ones used in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
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Figure 3: Labor wedges for selected countries
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times of large spreads are associated with labor markets that are more distorted and are
also consistent with the results presented in tables 1 and 2. That is, the unusual drop in
employment, observed mainly in southern european countries and Ireland, may be related
with the sharp increase in interest rate motivated by a sovereign debt crisis.
3 Model Economy
The previous section suggests that labor markets and credit access are closely related.
Here, a typical sovereign default model is presented to account for that relationship. The
model economy is one based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) where a sovereign government
borrows or saves from international markets in order to maximize consumers utility. Be-
cause the government cannot commit to honor its debts contracts, international investors
demand an interest rate premium over the risk free rate to account a default probability.
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Table 3: Labor wedge panel regressions
CRRA GHH
interest rate spread -1.60** -1.71** -0.23** -0.19**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04)
output gap -0.75 -0.41 -0.65** -0.40**
(0.38) (0.28) (0.13) (0.12)
time effects No Yes No Yes
N 569 569 569 569
R2 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.31
Notes: Data source: OECD, ECB. All regressions are estimated using fixed effects and the standard errors,
presented in parenthesis, are heteroskedastic robust. The statistical models without fixes constrains βt = 0
for all t. ∗∗ significance at 1%; ∗significance at 5%.
The main departure from the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) resides on the labor
market. On one hand consumers supply labor based on the income tax rate determined by
the government. On the other hand, firms demand labor under a working capital constrain.
The first feature links labor supply to credit conditions as a debt constrained government,
in need to finance public expenditure, has to increase taxes that distorts consumers de-
cisions. As for the second feature, under the assumption that higher government interest
rates spillover to corporate higher interest rates, then, due to the working capital constrain,
harsher credit conditions affects firms inducing them to hire less labor. The details of this
model are outlined in the following sections.
3.1 Household
A representative household is infinitely lived, valuing consumption and labor accordingly
to:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht) (2)
where E is the expectation operator, β denotes the discount factor, and the period
utility u : R+ × [0, 1] → R is: continuous, differentiable and concave in both arguments;
increasing in c and decreasing in h. Maximization of lifetime utility (2) is subjected to the
following budget constraint:
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ct = (1− τt) · (wtht + pit + et) (3)
Consumption ct equals income provided by wage income derived from supplying ht hours
at a wage rate of wt, firms’ profits pit and interest earnings et, all income taxed at rate
τt. Optimality from maximization of (2) subjected to (3) imply the following first order
condition:
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ht
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ct
= (1− τt)wt (4)
That is, marginal rate of substitution of hours to consumption equals the wage rate net
of taxes. Equation (4) together with (3) characterize simultaneously this household labor
supply and demand for consumption goods. Similar optimality conditions were used within
the framework of sovereign default models, for example, in Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza
(2010) and Arellano and Bai (2013). Implicitly in this environment is the restriction that
the household cannot directly access external borrowing.
3.2 Firm
Final consumption goods are produced by firms using labor services as inputs. The
production function f(h) - continuous, differentiable, concave, and satisfying Inada’s con-
ditions - is also subjected to a multiplicative stochastic productivity shock zt that follows a
Markov process. As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) or Uribe and Yue (2006), profits equal
the difference between revenues and costs that include both the wage bill and working
capital costs. This means that in order to pay wages to workers, firms need to set aside a
fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of the wage bill immediately after the beginning of the period in order to
pay workers before the end of the the same period. However, because production is only
available at the end of the period, firms need to borrow an amount equal to θwtht from
households at a gross interest rate of Rt ≥ 16. As such, at the end of time t, profits are
given by:
pit = ztf (ht)− wtht − (Rt − 1) · θwtht (5)
It follows that profit maximization implies the following equation that characterizes
6A different way to interpret working capital requirements is that, due to some friction in the technology
for transferring resources, workers demand a fraction θ of the wage payment before production takes place.
For that reason, firms need to borrow in advance.
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demand for labor:
wt =
1
1 + (Rt − 1) · θ · zt
∂f(ht)
∂ht
(6)
Note that the wage rate is equated to the product of the marginal product of labor and a
term bounded between 0 and 1. It follows that, from the firm’s perspective, an increase in
its cost of financing is equivalent to a negative productivity shock.
3.3 Government
The sovereign government finances public consumption using income taxes or by issuing
non-contingent debt issued in international markets at price qt. Because of the inability
of international investors to enforce contracts, the government has the ability to repudiate
its debt liabilities. However, under the case of default, the government acquires a bad
credit history and becomes excluded from borrowing for for a random number of periods.
At the end of that period, previous debts are wiped out and a good credit history status
is regained. However, while excluded, firms productivity is negatively affected becoming
z˜ = z − l(z) where l(z) is an increasing loss function. This implies that the government
budget constrain is given by:
τt · (wtht + pit + et) =gt +Dt − qtDt+1 if repay (7)
τt · (wtht + pit + et) =gt if default (8)
Acting as a benevolent, the problem for the government with good credit history is to
choose the tax rate τt, next period debt Dt+1, and whether or not to repay current in order
to maximize the household’s lifetime utility (2) subjected to equations (7) and (8), together
with (3) and (4). These last two constraints are due to the fact that the government has no
access to lump sum tax instruments and has to operate under a competitive labor market
equilibrium.
3.4 International Investors
If the government has a good credit history, then it can issue debt in international
markets where risk neutral investors charge a debt price qt that compensates them for the
opportunity cost of alternative investments with a certain rate of return of 1/q¯−1 to which
adds the risk that the government defaults on its debt. Letting N(D, z) be an indicator
function taking 1 whenever the government decides to default, then international investors
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price new issuances of debt accordingly to:
q(Dt+1, zt) =q¯ ·
ˆ {
[1−N(Dt+1, zt+1)] +N(Dt+1, zt+1) · ϕ(Dt+1)
Dt+1
}
dF (zt+1, |zt) (9)
where F (zt+1, |zt) is the process governing productivity and 0 ≤ ϕ(Dt+1) ≤ Dt+1 is a
transfer that lenders receive in case of default. The debt price schedule (9) is composed
of 3 main elements: the first one, q¯, is the price for risk-free investments; the second,´
[1−N(Dt+1, zt+1)] dF (zt+1, |zt), is the probability that the government honors the con-
tract; and the last,
´ [
N(Dt+1, zt+1) · ϕ(Dt+1)Dt+1
]
dF (zt+1, |zt), is the expected recovery rate.
Because these last two terms are non-negative, it must be that q ≤ q¯, or equivalently, the
new debt implied interest rate is larger or equal to the risk-free interest rate. Finally, the
ratio ϕ(Dt+1)/Dt+1 describes the investors recovery rate schedule if default is to occur7.
3.5 Recursive Formulation
The timing of events for a government with good credit history is summarized as fol-
lowing:
• the government enters a period twith debt Dt and productivity zt is realized and
observed.
• if the government decides to repay Dt, it then chooses current tax rate τt, and new
debt issuances Dt+1 to finance public consumption gt.
– at the beginning of the period, households decide on labor supply and firms
on labor demand. Labor market equilibrium implies that for a wage rate wt,
hst = h
d
t = ht. Simultaneously, households also decide on their consumption
schedules.
– production follows and, towards the end of the period, profits pit and interest
earnings et = (Rt − 1) · θwtht are transferred to the household and consumption
follows.
– next period t + 1 the government keeps its good credit history and starts the
period with Dt+1.
7Similar functions have been used in the sovereign default literature, for example in Yue (2010), Erasmo
(2008), or Arellano and Bai (2013).
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• if the government decides to default then credit history becomes bad, productivity
suffers a loss equal to l(zt) and the government chooses taxes τt to finance gt.
– a similar chain of events as above determines consumption and labor, ct and ht
respectively.
– with probability ζ the government regains a good credit history next period t+1
and previous debts are erased, otherwise in t+ 1 credit history is still bad.
The remaining object to be define is the interest rate firms face regarding their working
capital requirements. As in existing models of business cycles for small open economies
with working capital (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005, Uribe and Yue, 2006, or Mendoza and
Yue (2012)), the interest rate that affects firms is a function of the interest rate on sovereign
debt:
R = l (1/q) (10)
where l is an increasing function.
The structure described above implies that the government’s problem admits a recursive
formulation, where (2) is maximized subjected to equations (4) to (9). Letting v(D, z) be
the value of the government with good credit history, then the problem can be represented
as
v(D, z) = max
N∈{1,0}
{
(1−N) · vrep(D, z) +N · vdef (z)} (11)
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where the value of repayment is defined as8:
vrep (D, z) = max
D′≥0,τ
{u(c, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′)]} (12)
st
c = (1− τ) · (wh+ pi + e)
pi = zf (h)− wh− (R− 1) · θwh
e = (R− 1) · θwh
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= (1− τ)w
w =
1
1 + θ (R− 1) · zfh(h)
τ · (wh+ pi + e) = g +D − q(D′, z) ·D′
R = l (1/q(D′, z))
Note that, because the government decides on debt and taxes under a labor market equi-
librium9, once new debt is chosen, taxes become determined by (7). Also, constraints in
(12) can be substituted into one and another yielding, after some algebra, a simplified
representation:
vrep (D, z) = max
D′
{u(c, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′)]} (13)
st
c = zf (h)− g −D + q ·D′ (14)
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
=
1
1 + θ (l (1/q(D′, z))− 1) · z
fh(h)
∂h
− (g +D −D′) · fh(h)
f(h)
(15)
Equation (14) can be interpreted as the usual resources constraint, and (15) as an imple-
mentability constraint.
8uc(c, h), uh(c, h), and fh(h) stands for
∂u(c,h)
∂c ,
∂u(c,h)
∂h , and
∂f(h)
∂h respectively
9That is, it represents the set of competitive allocations (c, h) such that both consumers and firms are
optimizing given prices and taxes.
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Similarly, the value of default is defined as:
vdef (z) = u(c, h) + βEz
[
ζ · v(0, z′) + (1− ζ) vdef (z′)] (16)
st
c = [z − l(z)] f (h)− g (17)
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
=
1
1 + θ (l (1/q(D′, z))− 1) · [z − l(z)] fh(h)− (g +D −D
′) · fh(h)
f(h)
(18)
3.6 Recursive Equilibrium
With the above model economy description, a Markov Perfect Equilibrium can be de-
fined. This is an equilibrium notion requiring that, at every possible state, agents’ beliefs
over other agents are specified. Given these beliefs, each agent must choose actions that are
the best responses to the strategies of the other agents. The government and international
investors only use stationary Markov strategies.
Definition 1. A recursive equilibrium is a set of:
i) Value function: v(D, z)
ii) Debt price function: q(D′, z)
Such that
a) Given the debt price function q(D′, z), the value function v(D, z) solves the government
problem (11)
b) Given the value function v(D, z), the debt price function q(D′, z) is consistent with the
lenders zero profit condition in (9)
Condition (a) requires that the government’s default and borrowing decisions are opti-
mal given the debt price schedule. Condition (b) requires the equilibrium debt prices that
determine country risk premia to be consistent with optimal lender behavior. Moreover,
given that allocations satisfy equations (4) to (9), then these are are consistent with a com-
petitive equilibrium in the labor market and satisfy the economy’s resources constraint. A
solution to this recursive equilibrium includes solutions for new debt D′(D, z), consumption
c(D, z), hours h(D, z), taxes τ(D, z), and default sets N(D, z).
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4 Calibration and Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative implications of the model outlined are studied using numerical sim-
ulations at a quarterly frequency and using a baseline calibration. In order to proceed in
that way, different functional forms are selected.
4.1 Functional Forms
The household utility function is a GHH after Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman
(1988) and has a long tradition in literature studying business cycles in small open economies
(Mendoza, 1991; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). This utility func-
tion has the advantage of shutting down the wealth effect on labor supply, therefore shocks
in the productivity process have an output response of the same signal. This is of particular
relevance for the presence exercise that focus on labor response to a sovereign default crisis.
For example, with a common CRRA utility function10, a strong negative income shock
would generate a counter-factual increase in labor supply due to strong wealth effects. For
that reason, instead, the following function is used:
u(c, h) =
1
1− σ ·
(
c− Γ h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
(19)
For the productivity loss function under default l(z), a non-linear specification that is
increasing with the the level of productivity:
l(z) =
0 if z ≤ zˆz − zˆ otherwise (20)
This function is the same that is used in Arellano (2008) or Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012). These authors showed that an increasing loss function in productivity is impor-
tant to generate realistic default frequencies11. Such loss function enables some additional
contingency to the government by penalizing (disproportionally) less severely if a default
occurs in a low productivity state of the world. The model proposed by Mendoza and Yue
(2012) endogenizes this loss function using a model of trade credit.
The recovery schedule ϕ(D) captures the fact that, under default, lenders recover part
10A constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function has the following functional form: u(c, h) =
c1−σ/ (1− σ)− Γh1+γ/ (1 + γ).
11This is in contrast with a proportional one as, for example, in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
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of their debts. This function is included in the model as it is important for quantitatively
matching the behavior of spreads in the data. Because the focus of this paper is on labor
market distortions, a reduced-form approach to this feature is used. The functional form
that is used is the following:
ϕ (D) = min
{
D¯,D
}
where D¯ is a constant parameter. This choice of the functional form captures a similar
recovery schedule as the one derived endogenously in Yue (2010) where, after default, the
government and lenders engage in a Nash bargaining negotiation before credit market access
is regained 12.
As for the gross interest rate on working capital, the following form is used:
R = g (1/q) = max
{
R¯, 1/q
}
Different models of small open economies with working capital (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005;
Uribe and Yue, 2006) assumed that the interest rates on sovereign debt and working capital
are equal. Here, the same assumption is made with the difference that there is a maximum
cap on the interest rate charged by firms equal to R¯. The reason for the imposition of that
limit resides with the fact that sovereign debt interest rate becomes undefined under default.
In Mendoza and Yue (2012), it is argued that the perfect correlation between the two interest
rates are because the government confiscates the repayment of firms when it defaults.
Arellano and Kocherlakota (2014) finds evidence of positive co-movement between private
and sovereign interest rates. Also, in the appendix A.1, evidence for Euro Area countries
is provided where, using the interest rates for new loans to non-financial corporations as a
proxy of corporate interest rates, it is showed that this correlation can be as large as 0.83
for the case of Greece.
Finally, the productivity process is modeled as a log-normal AR(1), with
log z′ = ρz log z + ′ , ′ ∼ N(0, σz)
The numerical computation of the model uses value function iteration with finite element
method, where optimal policies are search using grid search. Details of the algorithm used
can be found in the appendix A.2.
12Because in Yue (2010), the level of defaulted debt is irrelevant for negotiation (to the extent that the
recovery rate is less than 100%), the recovery rate function is hyperbolic. A similar feature is displayed by
the exogenous function used in this model: ϕ (D) /D.
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4.2 Model Calibration
The model is computed at a quarterly frequency targeting the Greek economy for some
key data moments. As already mentioned, Greece provides a recent example of the dramatic
impact of of a financial crisis on labor markets. Greece announced its default in the last
quarter of 2011 and, between 2009 and 2012, the unemployment rate jumped from 7.96% to
22.1%, a 14.2pp increase while, during the same period, real GDP fell by 16.3%. Mendoza
and Yue (2012) shows that these observations are not uncommon for previous default
episodes on emerging economies. High frequency data readily available for provides an
additional advantage of focusing this study to Greece.
With the numerical solution at hand, the model is then used to interpret the macroeco-
nomic dynamics of variables of interest around default, such as output, consumption, and
labor, while other features of simulated economy closed with other features of the observed
data. Observed data for output, consumption, employment, and trade balance are season-
ally adjusted quarterly real series obtained from OECD from 1990 to 2015. Government
debt is taken from the EUROSTAT. The tax series, also taken from the EUROSTAT, refers
the annual average income tax of a single person with no children and 100% of the average
income received by a worker in Greece. Output and consumption are in logs while trade
balance is presented as a percentage of GDP. All series are filtered using a Hodrick–Prescott
filter with a 1600 smooth parameter with the exception of the tax series that uses a 6.25.
The fixed parameters used in the calibration can be found in table 4. The risk aversion
on consumption σ = 5 is adopted from Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The Frisch elasticity
of 1/γ = 2 is higher than some used in the literature however is not uncommon to see even
larger values be some authors13. In the framework, a large Frisch elasticity enables to model
to generate a strong response of labor supply to shocks affecting the marginal product
of labor14. The labor income share is taken directly from averaging one of AMECO’s
adjusted wage share series. Parameter ζ = 0.2 implies an average market exclusion of
5 periods which coupled with the quarter of exclusion totals 6 quarters and is consistent
with evidence presented in Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2011) finding that resumption have
become faster in recent decades. Given that evidence is scarce on the importance of working
capital, previous values used in the literature are used for guidance on the determination
of θ. Because Neumeyer and Perri (2005) uses a value of 1 and Mendoza and Yue (2012)
13Shimer (2009), uses a Frisch elasticity of 4 in his model in order to justify some large labor movements
in some European countries.
14Note that with a Frisch elasticity of 0, changes in the marginal product of labor would imply no change
in hours supplied.
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of 0.7, an intermediate value of θ = 0.85 is used in the model’s calibration implying that
firms hold about 3.5 months of wages in working capital.
Table 4: Fixed parameter values
Parameter Value Target
Risk aversion on consumption σ 5 (standard in the literature)
Inverse Frisch elasticity γ 0.5 (standard in the literature)
Risk free debt price q¯ 1/1.005 Germany’s government interest rate
Output elasticity of labor α 0.51 Labour income share in GDP
Redemption probability ζ 0.2 5 quarters of market exclusion
Share of working capital θ 0.85 (standard in the literature)
Labor disutility Γ 1.232 Mean labor supply of 1/3
All the remaining 7 parameters
{
β, σz, ρz, zˆ, D¯, R¯, g
}
are jointly estimated using Gener-
alized Method of Moments where the following data statistics are targeted: average recovery
rate; standard deviation and autocorrelation of output; mean spread; spread’s standard de-
viation; average drop in employment from the time of default relatively to its level of 3
years before; average government consumption to output. The results of this estimation
process can be found in table 5 and 6.
Table 5: Estimated parameter values
Parameter Value
Discount rate β 0.852
Standard deviation of error σz 0.00594
Persistency of productivity ρz 0.949
Productivity loss zˆ 0.955
Debt recovery D¯ 0.0447
Firms interest rate at exclusion R¯ 1.0555
Government consumption g 0.105
Some comments are in order. First the, the choice for this moments attempts to bring
some discipline to the model in the sense that the simulated economy resembles Greece.
21
Second, some targeted moments try to capture the Greek default event, namely the 50%
recovery rate offered to Greek bondholder and the fall in employment15. Third, the esti-
mated parameter of the firms interest rate when the government is in default, R¯ = 1.0572,
implying a annualized interest rate of 25%, looks a bit high but, for example, evidence from
the 2002 Argentinean default indicates that such values are not unreasonable as average
lending rate and the average deposit rate increased to above 50% (Arellano and Kocher-
lakota, 2014). Finally, as can be seen in the top panel of table 6, the simulated moments
are in quite close to the data targets although the difference is not exactly zero. In par-
ticular, the average fall in employment is 13% when in the data is 1.5. The reason for
this gap is related with the fact that the model constrains the simulated series in certain
directions, making it impossible to perfectly match the data moments even in an exactly
identified estimation, that is, one where the number of parameters is equal to the number
of moments.
Table 6 presents the simulation results for both targeted and non-targeted moments.
Within the targeted moments, it should be underline that the model is able to generate a
fall in employment of the same magnitude as observed in the data. Moreover, the model
maintain most of the discipline imposed by the targeted moments. Regarding non-target
moments, a large degree of proximity with the observed data is also achieved along the
typical moments that are usually studied in the literature. In particular, volatility of
consumption is larger than output and both spreads and trade balance are negatively
correlated with output. Given the focus of the model on other features, such as employment
and taxes, moments regarding these dimension, usually not analyzed in previous literature,
can also be computed. The results shows that, at least qualitatively, the model mimics
well the data observations. In particular, tax rates are counter-cyclical and also negatively
associated with employment. The default rate is in line with other studies of sovereign
default, with a non-targeted annual frequency of 3.1%. The main discrepancy in this
calibration is related with the average debt to output where the model generates 21% while
in the data shows that Greece has a level of government debt of more that 100% of output.
With this respect, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) extend the Lucas example to show that
financial autarky is not a harsh punishment enough to sustain large amounts of debt in
equilibrium, so the results from the simulation are not inconsistent with those findings.
15These choice of recovery rate and employment fall are that far from the ones observed in the history of
sovereign default. Benjamin and Wright (2009) document that on average recovery rates amount to about
60% and Mendoza and Yue (2012) present evidence showing that, on average, employment is 15% lower
than in the three years prior to the defaults.
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Table 6: Targeted and non-targeted moments: simulation and data
Targeted moments Data Model
Expected recovery rate mean(Drecover/D) 50% 51%
Standard deviation of output stdev(y) 0.022 0.022
Autocorrelation of output corr(yt, yt−1) 0.68 0.65
Mean spread mean(ispread) 1.6 1.6
Standard deviation of the spread stdev(ispread) 1.5 1.7
Employment drop from 3 years before default mean(ht/ht−12 − 1) 17% 13%
Government consumption to output mean(G/Y ) 20% 18%
Non-targeted moments
volatility of trade balance stdev(TB/Y ) 1.4 1.6
relative volatility of consumption to output stdev(c)/stdev(y) 1.1 1.4
correlation of output with consumption corr(y, c) 0.72 0.96
correlation of output with trade balance corr(TB/Y, y) -0.45 -0.69
correlation of output with spread corr(y, ispread) -0.58 -0.78
correlation of trade balance with spreads corr(TB/Y, ispread) 0.44 0.83
correlation of output with employment corr(y, h) 0.54 0.60
correlation of employment with spread corr(ispread, h) -0.74 -0.32
correlation of output with tax rate (annual) corr(τ, y) -0.37 -0.81
correlation of employment with tax rate (annual) corr(τ, h) -0.49 -0.31
Mean debt to output mean(D/Y ) 110% 22%
Default rate (annual) default rate 1-4% 3.1%
These results indicate that austerity policies, that is, tax policies that tend to aggravate
output fluctuations, are a consequence rather than an active policy of governments. When
an economy is hit by a recession, harder credit conditions forces a government to increase
tax rates under an impossibility of reducing public consumption. Such increases affect
negatively consumers that respond by lowering their market supply of labor. At the same
time, because firms are also exposed to similar credit conditions as the government, lower
their labor demand when faced with higher interest rates. Both these adverse effects on
consumers and firms would not be present under an alternative economy without working
capital constraints and where lump sum fiscal policies are available to the government.
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Thus, such movements in hours can be interpreted as a labor wedge that falls when the
economy is in recession. Under a default event, all the effects previous described become
further pronounced.
4.3 Policy and Impulse Response Functions
To facilitate the the understanding of the mechanism underlying the results presented
in the previous section, figure 4 plots the computed model policy and debt price functions,
as well as the default set. New debt is a increasing function of current debt and produc-
tivity; the debt price schedule is downward sloping in current debt, and increasing with
productivity. This reflect the fact that indebted governments have higher probability of
default, and this probability is smaller when the economy is growing (as depicted in the
right panel of figure 4).
Figure 4: Policy functions, price schedules, and default set
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Alternatively, impulse response functions can be plotted to analyze the optimal govern-
ment policy when the economy is hit by external shocks. Figure 5 shows the economy’s
response when the productivity suddenly drops by 1% from its average.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions when productivity falls by 1% (1.7 standard deviation
of z)
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One first observation is that, although productivity falls by 1%, output falls by about
4%. This happens due to an endogenous response of labor that retraces by about 6%. The
figure also shows that, in response to the fall in productivity, the government decides to
increase the tax rate from 19% to 22%. Additionally, on impact, the interest rate spread
increases substantially and that is due to the fact that, given the current debt level, the
government is less able to repay in the future. Due to this, the government quickly reduces
its debt exposure which, on its turn, implies that interest rates normalize quickly after.
It follows that labor demand increases as interest rate are part of firms hiring costs, and
this improves also the economies output, expanding the taxation base which allows the
government to reduce tax rates. Thus, this chain of events shows how a productivity shock
impacts the model economy.
Note that equation (4) and (6) can be combined into the following:
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ht
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ct
= (1− τt) 1
1 + (Rt − 1) · θ · zt
∂f(ht)
∂ht
Which can be re-written as:
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ht
∂u(ct, ht)/∂ct
= ωt · zt∂f(ht)
∂ht
(21)
Here ωt is the labor wedge, the combined distortion of the income tax and the working
capital constraint on the labor market. Applying a log-linearization of (21) implies near
the values (τ¯ , R¯):
ωˆt = − τ¯
1− τ¯ τˆt −
θR¯
1 +
(
R¯− 1) θ Rˆt (22)
where the first term in the right hand side is the contribution of the income tax to changes
in the wedge and the second term is contribution of the interest rate. Such decomposition
is depicted in figure 6 when productivity z drops 1%. One can see that from the almost 5%
fall in the labor wedge, 4% can be accounted due to an increase in the income tax while
1% is due to an increase of interest rates through working capital constraints. One can
conclude that both channels play an important role to explain the magnitude of the labor
wedge.
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Figure 6: Labor wedge and contributions when productivity falls by 1% (1.7 standard
deviation of z)
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4.4 Event Analysis - the Greek crisis
To evaluate the performance of the model, the Greek recent crisis is used as an event
analysis. That is, the Greek GDP path between 2006-2012 is used to feed the simulated
model using a sequence of productivity shocks {zt}. In this sense, the GDP path of the
model is matched to what is observed in the data and the remaining variables series, not
targeted directly, can be evaluated. The result of this exercise can be seen in figure 7.
The figure plots, for both data and model, time series for GDP, hours16, the interest
rate spread for government bonds, and the tax rate17. In the model, a default is triggered
on the 4th quarter of 2010, one year earlier from what happened in the Greek crisis18.
16Due to data limitations, Greek employment is being used in this panel and any fluctuations in average
hours is not being considered.
17The tax series is taken from the EUROSTAT and refers the annual average income tax of a single
person with no children and 100% of the average income received by a worker in Greece. To increase
comparability the model counterpart averages the generated tax rate for the same years.
18It should be noted however that before the its default event, Greece negotiated a bailout rescue loan
with the IMF and the European Union institutions in the 2nd quarter of 2010. Without such loan it is
uncertain if the government would be able to honor its debt obligations.
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Figure 7: Model and data time series for the Greek crisis
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The top panel of the figure shows that the model can capture well the evolution of GDP
during the Greek crisis with the exception of the periods after the default is triggered in
the model when GDP becomes constant. This is because of the output loss function (20)
that is used. With this function, when a default occurs, productivity is kept constant at
zˆ and for that reason the model economy looks static until redemption occurs. That is
also why employment, the interest rate spread, and the tax rate are constant in the model
after 2010. The second panel in the figure shows that the employment time series path
of the model captures the same dynamics that are observed in the data. The last two
panels shows the main drivers of these dynamics. Both the interest rate spread and the
tax rate are increasing in the model as well in the data. In the government the government
needs to raise taxes to finance an inelastic public expenditure thus affecting the household
supply of labor. At the same time, the prevalence of negative productivity shocks affects
the sovereign ability to fulfill its debt obligations, implying that interest rates continue to
increase and that, in turn, affects firms given their working capital requirements. These
movements combined add pressure on labor markets that subsequently collapse at default
with a 12% fall in hours when compared with pre-crisis values.
As mentioned before, both the effects of the interest rate spread and taxes affect neg-
atively the labour market. It should be noted that such impact is on top of an already
adverse path of successive negative productivity shocks. Contrary to a situation where
with full access to credit markets a government facing a recession would lower distortionary
taxes (Lucas and Stokey, 1983), taxes rates are countercyclical in this model. Limited com-
mitment in debt contracts implies that the interest rate is increasing when the economy is
in recession. Because credit markets become more restricted the government is forced to
raise taxes. This provides a channel between the possibility of government default and labor
market distortions induced by countercyclical tax and interest rates as shown in the bottom
panels of figure 7. Using the measure of labor market distortion introduced in equations
(21) and (22), figure 8 plots the labor wedge that this event analysis produces. As should
be clear, the labor wedge is decreasing - implying stronger labor market distortions - as the
Greek economy moves into default, consistent with the evidence presented in section 2.
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Figure 8: Labor wedge time series in the model simulation
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4.5 Robustness and Experiments
In order to isolate the non-standard features of the baseline model outline before, this
section re-evaluates the baseline model under different scenarios. Three alternative versions
of the model are computed under the same calibration summarized in tables 4 and 5:
Lump sum taxation The model is recomputed assuming that the government has access
to non-distortionary tax policies. That is, the new consumer budget constraint is now
given by:
ct = (1− τ¯) · (wtht + pit + et)− Tt
where Tt is a non-distortionary tax (which can be positive or negative) and τ¯ is the
average distortionary income tax rate generated in the baseline model19. The inclusion
of τ¯attempts to increase comparability between this version and the baseline model
by imposing the same level of average distortions in the labor markets. Given the
new consumer budget constrain, the counterparts of (14) and (15) simplify to:
c = zf (h)− g −D + q(D′, z) ·D′
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
=
(1− τ¯)
1 + θ (l(1/q(D′, z))− 1) · zfh(h)
Hence, the recursive problem of the government becomes exactly defined in the same
19In this exercise τ¯ is calibrated to be 0.1845
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way as before with the only difference in the above 2 equations.
Lump sum taxation with no working capital This formulation is exactly defined as
the previous one imposing that θ = 0, that is, in firms have no working capital
requirements.
External impact of working capital In the formulation of the baseline model, the im-
pact of the the government policy choices on the working capital requirements of
firms through R is properly internalized. That is, the government understands that
different prices for debt q affect firms decisions through different corporate interest
rates R under the function l(1/q). Under this experiment, instead, such impact is
external for the government. The recursive problem for the government becomes:
vrep (D, z,R) = max
D′
{u(c, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′, R′)]} (23)
st
c = zf (h)− g −D + q(D′, z) ·D′
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
=
1
1 + θ (R− 1) · zfh(h)− (g +D −D
′) · fh(h)
R′ = Ψ(D′, z′)
and the consistency condition R′ = Ψ(D′, z′) is such that Ψ(D, z) = l(1/q(D′, z))
where D′ comes from the optimal debt policy of the decision-maker given the state
variables. The formulation of this problem, is analogous to Kim and Zhang (2012)
that study government default decisions when borrowing is decentralized. It should
be noted that because the government’s problem changes, so does the computational
method to solve it20.
Endogenous government expenditure This experiment endogeneizes government con-
sumption. To implement it, the following utility function is used21:
u(c, g, h) =
1
1− σ ·
(
c− Γ h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
+ Υ · g
1−σ
1− σ
It follows that, after some algebra, that the recursive problem for the government can
20The formal definition of the problem and algorithm used can be found in the appendix A.3
21When this model is computed, the parameter Υ is calibrated to generate an average government to
output similar to the data.
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be summarized by:
vrep (D, z) = max
D′
{u(c, g, h) + βEz [v(D′, z′)]}
st
c = zf (h)− g −D + q ·D′
uh(c, g, h)
uc(c, g, h)
=
1
1 + θ (l (1/q(D′, z))− 1) · z
fh(h)
∂h
− (g +D −D′) · fh(h)
f(h)
uc(c, g, h) = ug(c, g, h) (24)
and a similar formulation is used for the value of default vdef . The only difference
with respect to the baseline model resides in equation (24) that simply states that
the marginal utility of private consumption equals the marginal utility of public con-
sumption.
Table 7 shows the results of the computational results of the different alternatives against
the baseline model. The results highlight the relevance of two channels introduced in this
paper to explain the large fluctuations of employment during default events. In particular,
when the sovereign has access to lump sum taxes, in the column “Lump sum”, the fall of
employment during a default is reduced by 4pp to 9%, substantially lower than what is
observed in the data. This happens since, under such environment, the government is not
pushed into raising income taxes when the economy is in recession. For that reason, part
of the tax distortions that increase the instability in labor markets disappear and, as a
consequence, the correlation between hours and the interest rate spread lowers as well as
the output volatility. When on top of lump sum policies, working capital requirements are
withdrawn, under column “θ = 0”, the employment is reduced by some additional 4pp to
5%. These effects highlight importance of the two transmission mechanism of labor market
distortions.
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Table 7: Model experiments and robustness checks
Targeted moments Data Baseline Lump sum θ = 0 External Endogenous g
mean(Drecover/D) 50 51 48 41 58 49
stdev(y) 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.1 2.1 1.7
corr(yt, yt−1) 0.68 0.65 0.85 0.87 0.70 0.67
mean(ispread) 1.6 1.6 2.0 3.0 1.8 3.0
stdev(ispread) 1.5 1.7 2.0 3.2 2.6 2.8
mean(ht/ht−12 − 1) 17% 13% 9% 5% 13% 11%
mean(G/Y ) 20 18 18 18 18 18
Non-targeted moments
stdev(TB/Y ) 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.2 1.7
stdev(c)/stdev(y) 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.6
corr(y, c) 0.72 0.96 0.86 0.83 0.97 0.94
corr(TB/Y, y) -0.45 -0.69 -0.40 -0.36 -0.70 -0.65
corr(y, ispread) -0.58 -0.78 -0.60 -0.59 -0.76 -0.78
corr(TB/Y, ispread) 0.44 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.77
corr(y, h) 0.54 0.60 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.58
corr(ispread, h) -0.74 -0.32 -0.20 -0.25 -0.40 -0.34
corr(τ, y) -0.37 -0.81 - - -0.85 -0.66
corr(τ, h) -0.49 -0.32 - - -0.42 -0.16
mean(D/Y ) 110 22 24 24 19 22
default rate 1-4% 3.1% 3.7% 5.6% 4.1% 5.8%
The column “External” shows that, when the working capital channel is not internalized
by government, the volatility of the interest rate increases. Without such awareness, the
labor becomes more negatively correlated with interest rate and default becomes more
frequent22. Given the magnitude of these effects, it seems reasonable to think that a
government takes into consideration that its own borrowing decision should affects firms
credit conditions, contrary to previous papers that use working capital requirements to
generate a channel between interest rates and labor demand (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005;
Uribe and Yue, 2006).
22A similar result is found in Kim and Zhang (2012)
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Finally, in the last column of table 7, government consumption is endogeneized to allow
for the fact that government consumption usually falls during default episodes (Cuadra
et al., 2010). Qualitatively, this alternative model behaves similarly to the baseline model.
However, a few important quantitative differences should be noted. First the correlation
of the tax rate with output falls to levels more close to what is observed with the data.
This happens because, as productivity falls, both private and public consumption follow,
implying that income taxes don’t need to be raised as faster. However, this also implies that
the cost of a default becomes less severe than in the baseline model and this increases the
default frequency. Given that the model preforms better in some dimensions while worse
in others, a more flexible, but also more complex approach may be necessary to properly
match the data23.
5 Conclusion
New evidence that supporting the idea that financial crises, arriving in the form of
sovereign default, generate distortions in labor markets can be seen in the recent Euro
Area debt crisis, where countries most affected, such as Greece, Portugal, or Ireland, were
also the same where employment suffered the most dramatic reduction from pre-crisis lev-
els. Because standard economic theory is unable to account reasonably for these drops in
employment, an alternative explanation relies on un-modeled market distortions. Using a
standard labor wedge decomposition to quantify distortions, it was shown that these are
positively correlated with government interest rate spreads. Increasing government interest
rates, are in fact indicative that credit is less available. For that reason, governments need
to rely more on taxation, often distortionary, to finance public expenditures. At the same
time, a close link between government and corporate interest rates provides an additional
source of through which distortions may affect labor markets when firms are required to
maintain working capital.
This paper studied the extent to which these two channels can account for labor dy-
namics in countries affected by sovereign debt risk using a simple but realistic economic
model that highlights in a transparent and intuitive fashion the economic relationship of
these dynamics. An otherwise standard sovereign default model is augmented to include
distortionary income taxation and firm’s working capital requirements. Calibrated to match
several data moments from Greece, the model is able to deliver simulated moments that are
23A potential source of additional costs of default may be related with political uncertainty that such
events produce as in, for example, Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2009).
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close to the observations from the data. In particular, the model generates an endogenous
increase in tax and interest rates when productivity falls, thus implying a deterioration
of the labor wedge. The model can account for an average 13% fall in employment with
respect to pre-crisis levels at a default event, a fall comparable to what is observed in the
data. From these 13%, 4pp can be associated with the an increase of the tax rate, and an
additional 4pp due to a spill-over of high interest rates from the government to corporations.
It can be concluded that these channels provide an important quantitative explanation for
the labor market dynamics that precede a default event.
Because the model was purposely design to be simple, several dimensions were over-
looked that can also be important, in particular international trade. As underlined by
Gorodnichenko, Mendoza, and Tesar (2012), a sudden change in import conditions, for
example through terms of trade shocks, can impose an important adjustment cost to firms
that can be protracted. Relating sovereign debt crises with firm’s international trade condi-
tions can be a source improvement of the explanations provided in this paper, especially if
there are strong complementarities between imported goods and labor in firm’s production
function. These ideas should be integrated in future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Corporate and Sovereign Interest Rates in Greece
Using data from the ECB, two measures of interest rate spreads are used:
1. Government interest rate spreads, defined as the difference between 10 year govern-
ment bond yield of each country against Germany;
2. Corporate interest rate spreads, defined as the difference between average corporate
yields charged on new loans in each country against Germany24;
Comparisons between these 2 indicators should be cautious for a variety of reasons: govern-
ment bonds don’t have any collateral associated with it, while corporate bonds may have;
heterogeneous institutional frameworks across countries should impact the yields charged
in banks, for example, stricter enforceability laws against default should imply different
interest rates; a selection effect where only healthy firms have access to credit markets may
contaminate cross-country comparisons of corporate bond yields.
Given these caveats, the following table present simple correlations between the two
indicators for Euro Area countries
Table 8: Simple correlation between government and corporate yield spreads for 2002 to
2012
correlation 95% CI
Austria -0.305 -0.540 -0.026
Belgium -0.085 -0.358 0.201
Germany - - -
Spain 0.766 0.618 0.862
Finland -0.116 -0.384 0.171
France 0.625 0.417 0.771
Greece 0.827 0.711 0.899
Ireland 0.179 -0.107 0.438
Italy 0.684 0.498 0.809
Netherlands 0.128 -0.159 0.395
Portugal 0.865 0.772 0.922
Slovenia 0.570 0.345 0.734
24The ECB defines these yields as a composite cost-of-borrowing indicator for new loans to non-financial
corporations (percentages per annum, rates on new business).
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A.2 Computation and Algorithm of Baseline Model
The implementation of the follows similar papers, e.g. Arellano (2008), and is coded in
Fortran imposing 200 grid points for both state variables z and D. The state space of D
ranges between [0; 0.45]. The AR(1) process for z is discretized into a discrete Markov chain
using Tauchen (1986) method, with bounds given by log z ∈
[
−4.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z; 4.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z
]
.
The algorithm steps uses value function iteration with the following structure:
1. Guess the value functions vrep,0(D, z) and vdef,0(z)
2. Use vrep,0(D, z) and vdef,0(z) to solve (13) and (16) using a grid search method over
the space of D:
(a) labor equilibrium is obtained using a non-linear equation solver
(b) the resulting functions of this maximization step are vrep,1(D, z) and vdef,1(z)
3. Evaluate max
{||vrep,1(D, z)− vrep,0(D, z)| , ∣∣|vdef,1(z)− vdef,0(z)∣∣}; if it’s larger than
v iterate on (1) using vrep,0(D, z) := vrep,1(D, z) and vdef,0(D, z) := vdef,1(D, z) until
converge
The maximum error allowed is ν = 10−6. The non-linear equation solver to determine
labor equilibrium uses Brent’s method.
A.3 Definition and Algorithm of Model with External Impact of
Working Capital
To implement an externality from a spill-over of the government interest rate spread to
corporate interest rates, the definition of the equilibrium changes from a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium to a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium as in Kim and Zhang (2012):
Definition. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of:
i) Value function: v(D, z,R)
ii) Debt price function: q(D′, z)
iii) Law of motion: R′ = Ψ(D′, z′)
iv) Policy function: D′ = χ(D, z,R)
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Such that
a) Given the debt price function q(D′, z) and law of motion R′ = Ψ(D′, z′), the value
function v(D, z,R) solves the government problem and yields D′ = χ(D, z,R)
b) Given the value function v(D, z,R), the debt price function q(D′, z) is consistent with
the lenders zero profit condition
c) The law of motion is consistent with firms interest rate: Ψ(D, z) = l(1/q(χ(D, z,R), z))
Noting that the consistency of the law of motion implicitly defines R as a function of
z and D, the value function v(D, z,R) can also be implicitly defined by only D and z.
Defining this functions as v˜(D, z), an algorithm to solve the model can be schematized as:
1. Guess the value functions v˜rep,0(D, z), v˜def,0(z), and a function Ω0(D, z)
2. Use v˜rep,0(D, z), v˜def,0(z), and R = Ω0(D, z) to solve (23) and the update the value
of default v˜def,1(z) using a grid search method over the space of D:
(a) labor equilibrium is obtained using a non-linear equation solver
(b) the resulting functions of this maximization step are v˜rep,1(D, z), v˜def,1(z) and
χ(D, z)
(c) compute Ω1(D, z) = l(1/q(χ(D, z), z))
3. Evaluate max
{||v˜rep,1(D, z)− v˜rep,0(D, z)| , ∣∣|v˜def,1(z)− v˜def,0(z)∣∣}; if it’s larger than
v iterate on (1) using v˜rep,0(D, z) := v˜rep,1(D, z), v˜def,0(D, z) := v˜def,1(D, z), and
Ω0 = Ω1 until converge is achieved
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